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The Expansion Trajectory: Trademark Jurisprudence in the Modern Age
Abstract

American trademark law is expanding. The expansion began with the adoption of
the Lanham Act in 1947. At that time and ever since, commentators and law makers
alike referred to the Lanham Act as a codification of the existing common law. In fact,
this codification was a selection and expansion of the common law. The United States
has continued to expand trademark jurisprudence: from incontestability, to cybersquatting,
to dilution - the notion of what it means to protect a trademark has
continued to expand. During this time, the Commerce Clause on which American
federal trademark protection is based has not changed.
The result of this inextricable expansion is that trademark jurisprudence in the
United States is becoming muddled. Originally, trademark protection was justified
as a right of exclusion that was granted to the user of a sign for their exclusive use
for as long as they used it and to the extent they used it. Now, the trademark right
has come to resemble the moral right of attribution andlor integrity of civil law
copyright systems.
This may be appropriate if the nation had a purposeful debate or discussion on turning
the United States trademark system into a system of moral rights. However, no
such discussion has taken place. Rather, Congress has enlarged the trademark right at
the behest of special interests without paying attention to the consequences. One consequence
is that trademark jurisprudence now has a striking resemblance to that of the
protection offered by moral rights in civil law countries.
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The Expansion Trajectory:
Trademark Jurisprudence
in the Modern Age
Kenneth L. Port

Abstract:
American trademark law is expanding. The expansion began with the adoption of
the Lanham Act in 1947. At that time and ever since, commentators and law makers
alike referred to the Lanham Act as a codification of the existing common law. In fact,
this codification was a selection and expansion of the common law. The United States
has continued to expand trademark jurisprudence: from incontestability, to cybersquatting, to dilution - the notion of what it means to protect a trademark has
continued to expand. During this time, the Commerce Clause on which American
federal trademark protection is based has not changed.
The result of this inextricable expansion is that trademark jurisprudence in the
United States is becoming muddled. Originally, trademark protection was justified
as a right of exclusion that was granted to the user of a sign for their exclusive use
for as long as they used it and to the extent they used it. Now, the trademark right
has come to resemble the moral right of attribution andlor integrity of civil law
copyright systems.
This may be appropriate if the nation had a purposeful debate or discussion on turning the United States trademark system into a system of moral rights. However, no
such discussion has taken place. Rather, Congress has enlarged the trademark right at
the behest of special interests without paying attention to the consequences. One consequence is that trademark jurisprudence now has a striking resemblance to that of the
protection offered by moral rights in civil law countries.
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KENNETH l. PORT

I. Introduction
In 1994, I predicted that a federal statute
protecting trademarks from dilution was
a dangerous notion as follows:
A federal statute protecting "super
trademarks" from dilution would create
a copyright in the mark itself, as well as
in the abstract idea of the mark in the
minds of the consumer and manufacturers .... Under dilution theory, the trademark holder not only controls each
expression of the mark, but also
attempts to control the manner in which
consumers or other manufacturers perceive of the mark. In this mattel~ dilution
theory attempts a monopolization of the
idea of the work even outside of any use.
In that respect, dilution theory violates
the ideal expression dichotomy.'

In 2000, I described and analyzed the
expansion of American trademark
jurisprudence and claimed that the United
States had inadvertently created a Civil
Law of trademarks, rather than remaining
honest to our common law origins.'
In the interim, this predicted expansion has continued unabated. Trademark
jurisprudence in the United States has
inextricably expanded since the inception
of the Lanham Act in 1947.' This article
presents several examples of this expansion. Incontestability, a doctrine created
with the Lanham Act, was the first step'-'
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Trademark jurisprudence settled into a
groove until 1989 when Congress created
the intent-to-use (ITU) system.' In 1996,
Congress enacted the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTOA).' In 2000, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA) was enacted.' Throughout the
history of the Lanham Act, Section 43(a)
has gradually been expanding. However,
it received a huge jolt in 1995 when the
Supreme Court held that color alone
could act as a trademark."
The result of this inextricable expansion
is that trademark jurisprudence in the
United States is becoming muddled.
Originally, trademark protection was justified as a right of exclusion that was granted to the user of a sign for their exclusive
use for as long as they used it and to the
extent that they used it. Now, the trademark right has come to resemble the moral
right of attribution and/or integrity of
civil law copyright systems.
This may be appropriate if the nation
had a purposeful debate or discussion on
turning the United States trademark system into a system of moral rights.
However, no such discussion has taken
place. I\ather, Congress has enlarged the
trademark right at the behest of special
interests without paying attention to the
consequences: one consequence being
that trademark jurisprudence now has a
striking resemblance to that of the protection offered by moral rights in civil
law countries.

l"--K~;;~leth L. Port, Tile "Umwluml" Etpallshm of Tmdemm'k Rigl!ts: Is a ret/Nal f)i/Illioll Stalule Necessary?, 18 SETON I-fALL LEGIS.).
433,486-87 (J994l(winner, L«das Memorial Award).
2 Kenneth L. Port, The Gmgressitmal Expal1sion of AmcriClIJI 'l/'adelllllrk '-'110: A Civil Law System ill Ille Makil1g, 35 Wilke Forest L. Rev.
827 (2000).
3 15 USc. §. 1052 (2008).

4 See 15 U.S.c. §§ 1064, J065, 1115 (200S),
5 Sec 15 U.s.c. § 1051 (2008),

6 Pub. L No. 104-98, §§ 3(a), 4, 109 Stat. 985, 985-86 (effective Jan. 26, 1996) kod ificd as amended (It 15 U.s.c. §§ 1125, 1127 (200Sl).
7 Pub. L No. 106·113, §§ 3001-10, 113 Stat. 15OJA·5,15, 545-52 (1999) (effective Nov. 29, 1999) (codified at 15 USc. § 1125(d) (200S}).

8 See Qualitcx Co. v. Jilcobson Prods. Co., 514 US. 159 (1995).
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Although some American scholars
have made a career out of lobbying for
moral rights; others have questioned
either the necessity" or the desirability"
of adopting a moral right scheme.
Regardless of how one might come down
on this issue, American trademark rights
today have come to resemble the moral
rights of attribution and integrity.
Congress has done this with no discussion or conversation about whether or not
this is a good idea. Worse yet, when the
Supreme Court has attempted to reign in
this expansion, Congress has simply
overruled the Court."
Congress seems serious about affecting
this expansion. Congress has been pushing this expansion most strongly in the
last decade. Congress has been confronted in this expansion by the Supreme Court
but to no real effect." This conspiracy of
expansion has gone on with no debate or
discussion with the American people to
decide if society wants an expanded
trademark system.
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this conspiracy of expansion has
resulted in small to medium sized corporations feeling extorted by large corporations over trademark rights." Therefore,
this problem is not merely jurisprudential.
In fact, it is quite real.
As trademark rights expand to resemble the moral rights of attribution and
integrity, they become stronger and
broader in scope. When they become
stronger and broader in scope, they are
asserted more aggressively against competitors. This results in competitors
changing their trademarks to avoid conflict. We know this is happening." This
article tells the story of how, legislatively,
this is done.
Section II presents each major expansion in American trademark history since
the Lanham Act was created. Section III
portrays the moral rights of attribution
and integrity and how trademark protection has come to resemble them. Section
IV discusses the tension that has been created between the Supreme Court and

9 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SoUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING II MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STA'IES (2010).

10 See Rebecca Stuart, A Work of Heari: A proposa! for 17 revision of Ihe Visual AI'lists lI.igilts Act of 1990 10 Bring IIII' Ulliled SlalfS Closel
fo III/mlll/iOlIllI Silmdards, 47 SANTA CLARA L REV. 645, 678-79 (2007) (The fighl of divulgation "has not proven to be a very importilnt
right in the international community.")i Kimberly Y.w. Holst, A Case of Bad Credil?: The Ulli/ed Slates and Ihe Proteetio!! of Moml Rights ill
)lJlellcctlial Properly Lnw, 3 BUFF. INTEU.. PROI'. L.J. 105, 128-30 (2006) (stating that the rights of disclosure and withdrawal do not need to
be protected under the BenlQ Convcntion, because COllllllon law already protects these rights; by contrast protection for iltlributiOll and
integrity have not had the sallle support from the courts). See also MEl.VILLE 13. NIMMER & DAVIt) NIMMER, NIMMER ON COJ'YllIGHT: A
ThEATJSE ON TIlE LAW OF LrrEllARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPEIllY, ANI) THE PROTECTIO~ OF IDEAS 8D.Dl, 80-8 n.24 (I994) ("Note that a
divlllgatioll right lllay exist in Berne by implication.")i SAM RICKErSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, 476 (1987) ("There is no reference to [the right of disclosu]"Qj in article 6[bis], but it is possible to argue that
such a right is required to be protected, by implication.").
11 Elizabeth Dillinger, Mutilatillg Picasso: The Case For AmeJ1dil1g fhe \liwal AI"lists Rights Act to Provide Pro/ee/ioll of Moml Rights After
D('iltil, 75 UMKC L. Rev. 897, 906 (2007) ("we should enact a high wall to prevent dismptive moral rights concepts from creeping into
U.S. law.") (quoting senator Orrin Hatch).

12 Following Moseley v. V Secret Cntalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) the Federal Trademark Djlution Ad (TDA) of 1995 was
amended by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312 §§ 2, 3(e), 120 Stilt. 1730, 1733 (effective Oct. 6,
2006) (codified in 15 U.s.c. § 1125(c) (2008).
13 Sec Wal-Mart Siores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays inc, 532 U.S. 23
(2001); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 US 418 (2003); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.s. 23 (2003); KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 540 U.S. 1099 (2004).
14 See e.g., Michael Barbaro & Julie Creswell, VI/ith a Trademark in Its Pocket, u,vi's Turns to Suing lts Rivals, NY Times, Jan. 29,
2007, at AI, available at http://www.nylimes.colll12007 /01/29/business129jealls.html (Levi Strauss has filed !learly 100 lawsuits
against competitors since 2001; Tonny Sorensen, chic[ executive of Von Dutch Originals, a relatively !lew competitor to Levi, claimed
the purpose of the lil\vsuits is simply to "scare people away").
15 Id.
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Congress over the appropriate scope of
trademark protection. Section V presents
some normative conclusions that this
problem manifests.

II. Doctrinal Expansion
The trademark right in the United States
has been on an inextricable course of
expansion since (and including) the
inception of the Lanham Act. The United
States Congress has known only one
direction in trademark law: expansion.'"
However, the trademark law can expand
only so much until it begins to resemble
some other law such as the moral right.
When it resembles a moral right, the
basic theoretical justification for that
trademark protection changes." Where it
once used to be a right of exclusion
limited to the extent of use and the
duration of use, its justification has now
changed to protection for protection's
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sake, which is not the original intent of
trademark protection.'"

A. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act went through a tortured
history before it was finally passed in the
days following World War II. There were
multiple attempts between 1938 and 1946,
when it was finally passed." The legislative history of the Lanham Act tells us that
this is a codification statute-no new substantive law was created with the Lanham
Act. It merely codified the existing common law with the intention of operating
as a registration statute.'" As we shall see,
this legislative history has not been realized. Many new substantive rights have
been granted. The first is the notion of
"incontestability."" A trademark registration can become incontestable anytime
after five years of consecutive use of mark
on the identified goods or services."

16 See e.g., Willis R. D.wi$, COll1melll, 11111'11110 Applications for Tradelllark J?egislmlioll, 35 W,\YNE L. REV. 1135, 1154 (1989) (stating tlwt
Congress' adoption of the intent-lo-use system represents "a major practical alld theoretical shift" from traditional U.S. trademark law);
Natalie J. McNeal, Vic/orill's Dirfy [jllle Secret: A Revealillg Look at Wlmf fhe Federal Trademark Dilutiml Act is Trying to Conceal, 56 OKI.A. L.
REV. 977, 977, 983-S4 (2003) (discussing Congress' rapid and unexpected passage of the 1995 Federal Tfiidemark Dilution Act; an act
which falls outside of the original scope of the Lanham Act); K,J. Greene, Abllsive Trademark Litigation alld the Incredible Shrillkillg
COllfusioH Doc/rille-Trademark Abuse ill the COI1/exl of Elltertaillmellt Media mid Cylierspace, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 609, 610-13 (discllssing how Congress' expi'lHsion of trtl.demark rights, particuL1rly in regards to the Anti-Cybersquatling Consumer Protection Act of
1999, has berm "dramatic")

17 The Lanham Act's purpose is to protect the relevant consumer and ensure filir competition; it does not confer any property
right in a trademark alone. See Unlted Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co" 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no such thing as property
in a (Tilde-mark, .."). When protection begins to extend beyond simply indicating the source or origin of a product or service, trademark law is llO longer is serving its originally intendi!d purpose, ld.
18 One example of this is the "Intent to Use" provisions, which have the effect of creating rights in trademarks prior to their actua!
use. See 15 U.s.c. § 1051 (b) (200S). Creation of rights before actual use is not an uncommon Ir<lit of civil law trademark jurisdictions, but
is generally inconsistent with common law jurisdictions, especially the United States where trademilfk rights are based on the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which requires "interstate commerce" or actuill use. See U.s. Const. art.!, § S, c1. 3; 15 U.s.c.
§ 1127 (2008).
19 While the act was originally introduced in 1938, the interl'ening events of VVorld War II caused the passage of the Lanham Act
to be delayed until after the war came to iln end, 1 THO)'lAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMI\RK5 AND UNFAIR CO),lI'ETITION § 5:4 (4th
ed. 2007). See also FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, P,\TPdS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TllADI?MARKS 23 (2d. ed. 1993).
20 See 15 US.c. §1127 (2008); J. THmfAS MCCARTHY, MCCi\lUHY ON TR,\DEMARKS ,\ND UNF,\lR COMPETITION § 11:49 at 11-105 (4th ed.
1996) (stilting thaI the act has been recognized as il statutory restatement o( the corresponding common law). In passing this act congress also hoped to bring American law into conformity with the more liberal principles of a number of foreign countries, stand<lrds to
which the United States had pledged ildherence by treaty and convention. S. Rep. No. 79·1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S,CC.A.N. 1274, 1277. See illso, Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 E3d 632, 647 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J. dissenting)(when the two confliet, patent law should displace trademark lmv because patent law is recognized in the Constitution while trademark law is a mere
codification of the common ]ilW).
21 See 15 USc. §§ 1064, 1065, 1115 (200S).
22 15 Us.c. §1065 (2008).
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Given the advantages offered to an
incontestable mark, it is remarkably simple to obtain incontestable status. An
applicant merely needs to file a Section 15
Affidavit and pay the proscribed fee to
obtain an incontestable mark." There is
no substantive evaluation of the mark or
the claimed use. The PTO merely has a
filing clerk check to make sure that the
correct people have signed the Section 15
Affidavit and other very simply formalistic requirements." After that, the mark
is incontestable.
An incontestable mark has many statutorily created advantages over a nonincontestable mark. Merely descriptive
marks that have become incontestable are
protected from a motion to cancel the registra tion." The Supreme Court went along
with this expansion in Park N' Fly v. Dollar
Park and Fly." There, the Supreme Court
held that an incontestable mark could be
used offensively, as well as to defend
against a motion for cancellation."
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Therefore, Park N' Fly was allowed to
use the fact that its mark had become
incontestable as a basis to sue Dollar Park
and Fly for trademark infringement, even
though its mark was descriptive and
therefore unenforceablec That is, save
for the statutorily created notion of
incontestability, Park N' Fly would have
lost this case and we would likely have
many "park and fly" providers at airports around the country. However,
because of this statutory gift, Park N' Fly
prevailed. Therefore, there is only one
provider of off-airport parking services
under that name.29
Another advantage of incontestability
is the fact that Section 33(b) of the Lanham
Act states that for an incontestable mark,
"registration shall be conclusive evidence
of the validity of the registered mark and
of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce."w Again, but

23 The current fee for filing a §15 declaration is $200 per class of goods/services. USPTO Fee Information,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2009seplember15.htm (follow "Trildemmk Processing Fees" hyperlink),
24 "The USPTO neither examines the merits of §15 Declarations nor 'accepts' §15 Declarations. However, Ihe USPTO will review a
§15 Declaration to determine whether it complies with statutory requirements." US1'TO, Trademark Process, Maintain/Hevie\\'"
Registration, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/maintain/prfaq.jsp (last visited Sept. 1O,2010).
25 15 U.S.c. § 1115 (2008) ("registration shall be conclusive evidence of the validity ... of the registrant's exclusive right to use the
registered mark in commerce .... and shall be subject (only1 to the following [nine] defenses.").
26 469 U.s. 1S9 (1984).
27 rd. at 205; see also id. at 193 (stating that "IOhe decision below is in direct conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 E2d 366, cert. denied, 429 U.s. 830 (1976) .... we now reverse,"
thereby clarifying the split thai developed in Ihe circuit courts regarding offensiw use of incontestability).
28 Id. at 205 ("[Tlhe holder of a registered mmk may rely on incontestability 10 enjoin infringement and that such an action may
not be defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive.").
29 Bec,mse use of the word combination "park and fly" was banned, "DoHar Pmk ilnd Fly" was forced to change their name to
"Park Shuttle N Fly." See http://www.hoovers.com/company /Dollar.Yark_and_Fly.Jnc/rrcrhjhhk-l.html (Last visited Sept. 10,
2010); www.parksllllilleflypdx.com/(last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (showing "Dollar Park and Fly's" current address in Portland, Oregon,
as the same as "Park Shuttle N FIy·s"). Despite losing the IllgaJ battle, the word "Shullle" in "Park Shuttle N Fly's" logo appears so
small that the logo actually appears as "Pmk N Fly." Jd. SCe also their sister company's website, boldly named "Seattle Park N Fly,"
available at http://www.parknflyseattle.com/. The company filed a similar version of this logo with the USPTO in 1999, bllt f(liled to
see ilthough to registration. See Registration No. 75640460 (Filed on Feb.I2, 1999). Holding several trademarks of their own, there is
also a "Park Shuttle and ny" http://www.parkshuttlefly.com/(last visited Sept. 10,2010) locilted in Boston; no affiliation with "Park
Shuttle N Ply"}. See their website, available at http://www.parkshuttlefiy.com/. Other competitors include: "Park, Sleep, Fly," available at http://www.parksleepfly.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2010); "Park, Rid(', Fly," aWlilahle at http://www.parkrideflyusa.com (Jast
visited Sept. 10, 2010); and "Park, While U Fly," available at http://www.stayJ23.com/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
30 15 U.S.c. § 1115 (200S}(Colltilluing on to list only nine available defenses for a defendant to ("ontest an infringement claim from
the holder of an incontestable mark).
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for the statute, a trademark owner could
never claim that its mark was "conclusive
evidence" of anything." A claimant would
have to prove each and every element of
its cause of action. Therefore, the right of
incontestability is quite strong."
If the Lanham Act is a codification of
the common law of trademarks," one
would naturally wonder where this
notion came from. Which state in 1946
had a judicially created notion that would
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resemble incontestability? Of course, no
such state existed. The best record we
have of the origin of the notion of incontestability is that it was once fixed in the
United Kingdom Trademark Act." In a
loose sort of a way, the US common law
incorporated the UK common law, but
that ended by 1946."
Therefore, Congress made choices in
1946 when it included the notion of incontestability in the Lanham Act. The only

31 See also 15 U.s.c. § 1065 (2008) (indicating that incontestable marks are conclusively presumed valid),

\.

32 Particularly in the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits where incon\{'stable marks have been held as presumptively strong, even when
they are descriptive. See Dieter v. B & HIndus., 880 F.2d 322, 329 mlh Cir. 1989); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th (ir,
1988). However, admittedly they ilre in the minority. See Homes & Land Affiliates, LLC v. Homes & Loans Magazine, Li.C, 598 F.
Supp. 2d 1248, 1261 n, 12 (MD. Ha 2007) ("Other circuits conclude lhill an otherwise weak mark is not made strong for the purposes of
the likelihood-of-confusion ;mi11ysis because of its incontestable status. See Oreek Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc, 803 F.2d 166, 171 (5th
Or. 1987) ("Incontestable status dOQS not make a weak m<lrk strong."); See also Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., 43
F.3d 922, 935 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that "incontestability affects the validity of the trademark but does not establish the likelihood of
confusion necessary to warrant protection from infringement"); Gruner -I- Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (2d
Cir. 1993) (implying that the marketplace strength of an incontestable mark may be challenged); Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc., 909
F.2d 250,252 (7th Cir. 1990) (incontestable status dOQS not preclude consideration of a mark's strength").

33 SIIELOO:-.i W. HALPERN n. AL., fuNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATf:S INTELLECTUAL PROP Elm' LAW: COPYRIGIiT, PATENT, TRADEMARK 293 (2007).
34 In 1875 and 1883 Great Britain enacted statutes which essentially provided that registration of a mark would become conclusive
evidence of the registrant's right to the exclusive use of the mark after five years after initial registration. Although these statutes never
use the word "incontestable," they are otherwise strikingly similar to the relevant provisions of the ct1frent Lanham Act. See An Act to
Establish it Register of Trade Marks, 38 & 39 Viet., ch, 91, § 3 (1875) reprinted in ROGER W. WALLACE & JOHN B. WILLIAMSON, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE REl.ATING To LE1TIiRS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS 612 (1900); An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law Relating to Patents
for Inventions, Registration of Designs, and of Trade Marks, 46 & 47 Viet., ch, 57, § 76 (1883) discussed in GR.<\!,ME B. DINWOODlE &
MARK D. JA.'-I!S, TRADEMAllK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 28 (2009).
35 Trademarks have been officially recognized by English common law as early as 1618. See Southern v. How, Popham's Reports
143,144 (1618), 79 Eng. Rep. 1243, 1244 (KoB. 1907»; Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Al1glo-Americal1 Trademark taw Begil1? All AllSWl.'r 10
Scheelller's COIJlmdrllllf, 8 FORDlfAM INTEl.!.. PROI'. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505, 517 (1998). In 1776, following the American Revolution, the newly
independent states enacted "reception statutes" enabling courts to readopt and develop the British Common Law they had previously
adhered to while colonies. Charles A. Bane, Fr0111 Holl and MaJisfieid 10 Story to UewellYIl alld Ml'l1lsc/Jikof[: The Progressive Developmel1t of
COlllmercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351, 363 (]983). By guaranteeing that judicial proceedings would follow the COUTse of established
common law, the Northwest Ordinance, approved by Congress in 1787, furthered this !lotion for the advancing territories. Peter L.
Strauss, Federal COllrls alld tire Common lAW, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 891, 910 n.96 (2002). In this way, historic Anglo-Saxon based common law
was eventually incorporated in all the newly created states (except Louisiana, who adopted a bijuridical system based on the Napoleonic
Code of 1804). Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 271 F.3d 835, 853 (9th Cir. 2001); Guy Canivet, Frellcil
Civil Lllw Between Past mid Revivlll, 20 CO~N. J. INr'L L. 111, 118-20 (2004). As the reception statutes became obsolete, the states eventually
enacted new laws. New York was the first to enact a state trademark law in 1845. EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND
UNFAIR TRADIt-:C 48 n.12 (1919). Despite only 62 trademark C,1ses having been decided in the United States by 1870 (40 of which were in
New York), the first Federal Trademark law was enacted. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198; A",NE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GIl.SON ON
Tl,ADEMARKS § 1.01[2J (Lexis 2010). Unfortun.'l!ely, under Supreme Court review in Trade-Mark Cases, 100 u.s. 82 (879), the 1970 trademark law did not meet constitutional muster. Pressured by the international demand from commerce treaties with several civil law
countries (Russia, Belgium and France between 1868-1869), Congress had failed to ground the law in the commerce clause as Thomas
Jefferson's had suggested in 1791. \VILLlA~1 HE~ItY BROWNE, A TllE,\TISE ON THE LAW OF TrlADEMARKS 297 (2d ed. 1885); EDWARD S. ROGERS,
GOOD WILL, TIMDE-MAllKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 48 (1919). The next significant attempt at a federal trademark registration came with tllE'
Act of 1905. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch, 592, 33 Stal. 724. England the same year. The Trade Marks Act, 1905: 7 Edw. Vll. Ch, 15. Both
American and English versions went through various amendments, until a new English Act was eventually passed in 1938. Trade Marks
Act 1938: 1938 ch, 22 1, 2 Geo. 6. This Act fundamentally changed the English system by permitting registration based on intent-to·use,
creating an examination·based process, and creating an application publication system. England's new act greatly influenced Fritz G.
Lanham, who the same year first introduced to Congress the American version. SHOEN O~o, OVERVIEW OF JM'ANr:SE TllADI:)'!ARK LAW (2d
ed. 1999). See also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.s. 418, 428 (2003) ("The United Stdtes took the [trademark and unfair competition) law of England as its own") (quoting l3. PAHISHALL, D. HrU.IARD, &). WELCH, TRADEMARKS AND UNMIR COMPETITION 2 (4th ed. 2000)
(alteration in original). This act was finally passed in 1946, and took effect one year later.
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source or jurisdiction that included a
notion of incontestability was the UK.
Congress elected to ignore the common
law of the rest of the United States and
embrace the UK version of incontestability." Therefore, more appropriately, the
Lanham Act should be said to be a "codification (of the laws we liked) statute,"
Incontestability was a serious expansion of the trademark law as it existed in
the United States in 1946." To be sure, it is
a valuable encouragement for firms to register trademarks. Given the incontestability provisions, along with its conclusive
evidence provisions, it would seem a violation of corporate fiduciary duties to not
claim incontestibility after five years of
continuous use.'" However, this is only
one of example of many to follow of
Congress expanding the trademark right
way past any notion of what the Common
Law of trademarks had been prior to 1946.

B. Intent To Use
The so-called Intent-to-Use ("ITU")" system is yet another expansion of the

American notion of trademark protection.
Passed in the Trademark Revision Act of
1988, the ITU system allows a trademark
claimant to register its intended use of the
mark with the PTO.'" Although section
7(c) of the Lanham Act requires that any
effect of the ITU system is "contingent
upon registration of the mark,"" in reality
the ITU system does grant several important rights that are not contingent upon
registration of the mark. By making "registration of the mark" a requirement,
Congress attempted to make ITU rights
contingent upon use of the mark in commerce, thereby preserving the constitutionality of the lTU system," However,
under the ITU system, before the mark is
used in commerce, an actual trademark
application is filed with the PTO and
thereby a record of this application is created. This application will be disclosed in
all subsequent and relevant trademark
searches. This gives notice to all subsequent actual users of that mark that some
entity has claimed priority to that mark,"
Therefore, although not a part of the
statute, an ITU application has a great sig-

36 Contrary to the Supreme Court's interpretation, English judges refused to recognize il registrant's right to the exclusive use if il
showing W<lS made that the mark had never been properly registered in the first place. See Park N' Fly v. Dollilf Park and Fly, 469 U.S.
189,209 n.8 (1984) (Stevens, )., dissenting),

37 See "Iso Maya Alexandri, The Jnil.'nliltiOlllll Ne..vs QlIllsi-Properly Paradigm {lIId Trademark Incolltestability: A Call for Ncwriting lilt'
13 Bar\,. J.t. & Tech. 303, 304-307 (2000)(cC]lIaling incontestability 10 the dubious creation of glwsi-propt'rly rights in news}.

[J1I1111l1l1 Art,

38 JONI\1HAN RWVID, MANAGING BUSINEsS lZISK: A PRAcrlCAL GUIDE TO

PROTEClING YOuR

BUSINESS 159 (2005) {stilling that not only is

it necessilrY to register a lr<1dem('lrk, but it is ('Ilso imperiltive Ih('ll a company monitor the m(lrketplace for infringing competition and
(nke ('Iclion when necessnry).
39 The reilsons cited for instituting the intent-to· usc system were to eliminate foreign ildvanlage in U.S. trademark registration, to
increase overall vnlue of the U.s. trademark system, and to bring the U.s. trildem(lrk system up to speed on current business priltices
around the world. S. Rep. No. 100·515, ilt 5 (1988), ilS reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5581. The intent-to-use notion was proposed
multiple times throughout the 20th century but had been held unconstitutional in United States v. Steffens, 100 U.s. 82 (J879) due to the
lacking 'use in interstate commerce' requirement. See Sheldon Klein, Tmd('mark l.1lw Bill: Marked lmp)"(l1!l'IIlcllt ill Rcgistrati(l1J 1~ll/rs, 11
LEGlIl. TIMES, May 30, 1988, at 16.
40 15 U.s.c. § 1051 (2008).

41 15 U.S.c. § 1057(c} (2008).
42 Unlike piltent ilnd copyright protection which me expressly provided for in the Constitution, U.S. trademark protection is
derived from the Constitution's commerce clause. U.s. Cons!. art. 1. § 8 d. 3.
E.g., David A. Cohen, Trademark Scm·dres mId 1I1Vl'5Iigl1limls, ill PATENTS, COJ'YRtGIITS, TRlIl)I;MARKS, ANt) LnHUlRY PROPERTY COURSE
(2001) [hereinilfter COllEN]; J JAY DllATLEi< & STEJ'HEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PIlOI'ERTY Lllw: CmlMERCJAl.AND
INDUSTRIAL PROI'ERn", § 1.06 (2003).
43

H,\NDBOOK SEllIES, 35, 37
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nificant deterrent effect for the ITU
claimant. As firms are naturally conflict
adverse:' once a mark with prior ITU
rights is discovered in a trademark search,
firms will work around such an ITU application, even if no use is ever made.
Because the ITU registration gives the
applicant three years in which to use the
mark," during that three year time period,
a third party will not know if actual use
will ever occur. As such, that third party
would likely steer in a different direction,
even if use of the ITU applicant was never
to be realized. That is, to risk adverse
firms, the ITU system has a real and specific effect, even if all statutory rights are
subject to use in actual commerce.
Through the ITU system, trademark
rights in the United States have expanded.
Without recognizing it as such, the United
States has taken a large step toward harmonizing how trademark rights are created. Most Civil Law systems create trademark rights upon registration, not upon
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use.'" In fact, the ITU system is largely in
line with all civil law nations, as use is not
required in civil law countries prior to or
as a "contingent" _of registrationY Even
though harmonization was not a stated
goal for the ITU system when debated by
Congress, it does result in a serious expansion of the trademark right and continues
the inextricable trend of expansion.

C Dilution
In 1996, the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act (FTDA) was signed into law by then
President Clinton.'" This law did more to
expand American trademark law than any
other act of Congress. The FTDA allows a
holder of a famous mark the ability to
enjoin the use of the same or similar mark
on completely unrelated goods or services." Under traditional trademark jurisprudence, before a cause of action for trademark infringement will lie, the defendant
has to be in competition with the plaintiff,

44 See COHEN, supra note 43, at 37 (stating that i1. trademark search is "appropriate, and possibly necessary" to avoid costly and
lime consuming conflicts with other potential mark holders); 3 McC,wT!w ON TRADEMARKS liND UNFAIR COMl'ETlTfON § 19:6 (4th eeL 2010)
(advising companies to "obtain a preliminary determination as to pOSSible conflict with previously used but unregbtered marks,
applied-for marks, and registered marks"),
45 Although six months is 11K initial prescribed time period in which to use the mark in commerce an additional thirty months of
extension may be granted to the mark holder for a mere showing of good cause and pilyment of the requisite fees. 15 V,S.c.

§ 10SHd)(2008). AdditionaHy, even in the event of inilppropriate extension request protocol, a mark holder may stili redeem him or herself by simply showing that the delay was unintentional. 15 USc. § 1051(d)(4) (2008).
46 Shohyoho !Japanese Trademark Act], Law No. 127 of 1957, art. 18. "A trademark right shall subsist upon its registration."
(Translation by author)
47 See e.g., Clark W. L;lCkert, Global '/i"ademark/Copyrighls Practicc-Protectiol1 al1d El1rm·CCmell/Iss1Ies ill PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMMlKS, AND LITERARY PROI'ERn' COURSE HANDBOOK SERICS, 171, 201 (997). Examples of Civil law countries that determine trademark rights by registration instead of use include Germany, Japan, France, Spain, Italy, Korea, China, and L1tin America. ld. Although
registration is not contingent upon use in these countries under specific limited cirCUlllstilnces trademark rights can be acquired
through use alone. Thomas J. Hoffmann, Advanced ScmiHarol1 Trademark Law ill PalCHls, il1 COPYRrGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERrES, 253 (1995)(noting that in Japan il party seeking trademark rights through use must show a major
portion of the public must be aware of the mark and in Germany more than 50% of the pubJic must be aware). See illso, Article 5,
Algerian Ordinance relating Lo Trademarks, No. 66·57 March 19, 1966; Article 18 Japanese Trademark law No. 127 Apr. 13, 1959; Article
59, Brazilian Trademark Law No. 5772 Dec. 21, 1971.
48 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. 1. No. 104·98,109 Stat. 985, 986 (1996) (codified at 15 U.s.c. § 1051, 1125, 1127
(2000) (amended 2006)). The Act was passed by Congress in December 1995 and signed by President Clinton on Janllary 16, 1996.
49 15 U.S.c. § 1125(c) (2008). The FrDA a!lows the holder of iI famous mark injunctive relief when an unauthorized use of the mark
causes dilution by either "blurring" or "tamishment." Jd. The 11'DA, however, limits the action to milrks which are famous. A famOliS
trademark is one thal is "widdy recognized by the general consuming public of the United States ilS a designation of source of the
goods or services of the nwk's owner." 15 U.S.c.A. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2008).
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or within the natural zone of expansion of the investment in the marks.% No one
the plaintiff.~
argues however that this was part of the
For example, although Kodak brand original common law of trademarks.
pianos do not infringe the KODAK Everyone agrees that it is an expansion of
mark, it does dilute the KODAK mark." the United States trademark right.
Dilution, we are told, is defined as the
lessening of the capacity of a mark to D.ACPA
distinguish itself." That is, the mere The Anticybersquatting Consumer Proexistence of another KODAK mark in tection Act (ACPA) also expanded
the world reduces the famous Kodak American trademark jurisprudence. The
Company's ability to distinguish itself. ACPA was enacted to prevent cybersquatTherefore, it is actionable, even though ting, the act of using someone else's tradethere is no competition and even mark as a domain name." The ACPA's
though there is demonstratively no con- protection was intended to provide a
fusion possible. 3;
cause of action for the registering someSome have claimed that dilution makes one else's trademark as a domain name in
the trademark subject to property owner- bad faith."
ship." Some have argued that it makes
The ACPA also created in rem jurisdicthe trademark subject to copyright-like tion. This allows a harmed trademark
protection." Some argue that it is neces- owner to sue the domain name itself in the
sary as marks evolve and become famous event the domain name registrant prothey must be protected them from free- vides the relevant Registrar with a false
loaders so that firms will continue to make name or address."

50 See Lynda J. Oswald, Arliclr:"?umisil1l1clIl" ilnd "Blllrring" 1I11der Ihe Federal 'hlldclIIllrk Dilulioll Act of 1995, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 255,
259 (]999) ("The tr<ldilionai cause of action under trademark law is for infringement, which has its basis in the tort of deceit. Trademark
infringement occurs when one party (the junior user) uses a trademark (the jUllior mark) thil! is identicil! or substantially similar to the
existing mark (the senior mark) of another user (the senior user) on competing goods, such that prospective purchasers are likely to be
confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the identity or source of the goods involved.").
51 See f-LR. Rep. No. 104-374 at 3 (1995) (listing three hypothetical examples of dilution of famous marks contemplated by the U.S.
House of Representatives, including: Dupont Shoes, Buick aspirin, and Kodak pianos).

52 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act (TDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, §§ 3(a), 4, 109 Stat. 985, 985-86 (codified as amended at 15 USc.
§§ 1125, 1127 (2008»), The TDA defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of
hood of confusion, mistake or deception." Td.
53 See 15 U.S.c. § 1125(c)(1) (2008).

(1)

competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likeli-

54 See Lynda J. Oswald, Articie:"TamisluHcnl" and "Blurring" Ul1der Ihe Federal Trademark Dil1/liOIl Ad of 1995, 36 AM. Bus, LJ. 255,
262 (1999) (comparing dilution to the tort of trespass; like trespass, dilution is bilsed upon an injury to the trademark holder and the
unjust enrichment of the pMty diluting the mark).
55 Sce Daniel H. Lee, RCllledyillg Filsi al1d Fililire Harm: Reconciling COIlflieting CirCHil COllri Decisions Under Ihe Fedeml7)ndcmark
Dill/tiol! Act, 29 PEP!'. L. REV. 689, 697-99 (2002); Roher! N. Klieger, Tradtmark Di/llliol1: Tile Whilllill:\ Awny of lire Rational Basis for
Tradcmark Frolalion, 58 U. PITT. L REV. 789, 847 (1997).
56 See H.R. Rep No. 104-374 (995), reprinted in 1995 U.s.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (stating that FfDA was created by Congress in part to
"encourage trademark holders to invest in their marks to achicve the famous mark status and to recognize the investments that mark
holders have made in making their marks famous."); JEROME GILSO,~, Ti<ADEMARK PROTEnIO~' AND PRACflCE, § 5A.D1(4)(a) (4th ed., Matthew
Bench ed., 4th ed., 2004). 'The abundant goodwill and consumer loyalty inspired by a well-known mark is 'the essence of many il successful business' and federal dilution laws protects the substantial investment necessary to advertise and promote the mark" Id.
57 The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACrA) Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 3001-10,113 Stat. 1501A-545, 545-52 (1999)
(effective Nov. 29, 1999) (codified at 15 USC § 1125(d) (2008).
58 15 u.s.c. § 1125(d) (2008).
S9 Id.
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In expanding trademark law in such a
way, Congress has made the possibility of
legitimate concurrent uses much less likely and consequently given more control to
the holder of the trademark. w This control
which permeates cyberspace is similar to
the general concept of moral rights which
instill an enduring element of control in
the creator of a work over their creation.'"

E. Expansion of 43(0)
The expansion of Section 43(a) claims
under the Lanham Act are rather notorious." Section 43(a) was first used to protect the shape of the Coke Cola glass bottle."; It has since been used to protect
everything from the inside of a Mexican
restaurant and its "festive eating atmosphere,"'" to the green-gold color of press
pads in the laundry industry,'" to the NBC
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chimes,'" to the vertically opening motion
of a Lamborghini car door."'
In Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods., the
Supreme Court held that "any" name,
symbol, or device that dentified the source
or origin of some good or service could be
a trademark." The court relied on the
word "device" to conclude that even the
smell or color of a product could be a
trademark if it indicated the source of that
good."; Of course, relying on the word
"device" for these purposes is historically
inaccurate. Originally, the word "device"
meant a design mark, not anything under
the sun.'"
There is no doubt that Section 43(a) has
resulted in an expansion of trademark
protection in the United States." In 1947,
there were few so-called nontraditional
trademarks which relied on Section 43(a)
for their existence." Since Qualitex in 1995,

60 Sl:C generaHy Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Tile Digilal1hlricmork Righi: A '/i'Glib/ilIS New Extraterritorial Readl of United Siaies UlW, 81
N.t. L. Rev. 483 (2003)(arguing that ACPA expands U.s trademark law too far pasl its' territorial boundaries). But sec, Roberl Nupp,
Note, Co/ICI/1TCllf U$C of Tradellwks 011 the Illtemel: RccOIlciliJig the COllcepl of Geographically Delimited hademarks with tile Reality (If flie
IJ1ienJe/, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 617, 621 (2003).
61 Eric M. Brooks, Comment, "TITLW" Jusm:E: SITF.~SrECIFIC ART MW lvloRAl. RIGHTS AnER U.s. ADHERE~CE TO TilE BERNE
77, CAl.. 1.. REV. 1431,1434 (1989).

CONV1MION,

62 Amy 13. Cohen, Fol/owilig llie Dim·/ioll of·Ii·llffix: Tmde Dress Law lind Flmcliollillity Revisited, 50 IDEA 593 (2010); David Klein, 711e
Evel··Ex/laliding Sdiml 43(11): ~'Vi/llh(' BllbMe 8l1rsl? 2 U. 8M.]". I~TELI.. PROI'. L.J. 65 (1993).
63 Registrillion No. 1057884 (Feb. 1,1977), pt·eviously 0696147 (Apr. 12, 1960).
64

l~lCO

Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd,505 U.S. 763 (1992).

65 Registration No. 1633711. See ,11$0 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 US. 159 (995) (resolving a disngreement among
courts of appeal ns to whether a color alone may be recognized as a villid trademark).

tll(~

66 Regis!ralion No. 0916522.
67 Registration No. 75883661. See also Automobili Lamborghini SpA v. Lnmboshop, inc., No. 2:07·cv·266·FlM-29SI'C, 2U08LJ.S.
Dis!. LEXIS 52589 (M.D. Fin., July 10, 2008) (finding that defendant violated Lamborghini's federally registered trademarks when it
advertised, manufactured, and sold counterfeill.ilmborghini merchandise including fully completed kit cars).
68 QualitexCo. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 US. 159 (1995).
69 "Since hul1ian beings might use a "symbol" or "device" almost anything al all that is capable of carrying meaning, this Ian·
guage, read literally, is not restrictive... If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as symbols why, one might ask, can a colOr not do
the same?" Id. at 162.
70 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., TIlE TRADE DR1;.$S bll'EROR'S NEW CLOTHES: WHY TRADE DRESS DOES NOT BEI.01'<C ON TilE PRINCIl'AL
RECISTER, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1131 (2000); Tmdcmark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367,373-91 (1999).
71 Specifically the Trademark Revision Act of 1988's use of the words "symbol and device," which lin accompanying Sel1l\te Report
states were employed "so as not to preclude the registriltion of colors, sh"pes, sounds or configuriltiollS where they function as trade·
marks." S. REI'. No. 100·515, at 41 (1988), available at http://www.ipmall.illfo/host('d_resoul"ces/lip.1/trademi\rk~/
PreLilllhamAct..097 ...SRJOO·515.pdf. "The definition of 'trademark' is broadened to reflect contemporary marketing prilctices ... " id.
72 See Kenneth 1.. Port, 011 NOlllraditioillal Tradelllnrk$ ____ Northem Kent. 1,. Rev.._ (2011); 3 (Wi!1imn Mitchell college of Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2010·05, 2010), ilvaililble ill http://p~pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.dm?
abstrilctjd=1561230 (stating thai prior to Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 US. 159 (1995) only 93 nontraditional trademarks
had been recorded).
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there have been 688 trademark applications for nontraditional trademarks
(excluding product configuration or product packaging, the original justification for
Section 43(a).'-' Of course, relying on the
word "device" for these purposes is historically inaccurate. It has reached such a
bizarre extent that one person was even
encouraged to apply to register his own
DNA sequence."

III. Moral rights
Much is made of the moral right in the
world of copyright. Much more is made
of whether the United States should or
does comply with its treaty obligations
under the Berne Convention that mandates
the protection of some moral rights." The
protection of moral rights as such
fundamentally sets the Civil Law apart
from the Common Law of copyright."
Moral rights include rights of attribution,
integrity, divulgation and withdrawal."
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In countries that recognize moral rights,
for example, it is a violation of the moral
right of integrity to colorize motion
pictures if the original author objects.
One way of expressing this difference is
that the Civil Law recognizes the personalityn of a work, while the Common
Law only recognizes an economic interest
in the work."
Although the moral right was originally saved for individuals and not corporations, some countries, such as Japan, consider a corporation a juridical person and,
as such, recognize a corporation's ability
to maintain and enforce moral rights. M As
such, it is not inconsistent to express a
corporation as an owner of the moral
right of trademark.
This distinction in copyright between
Civil Law nations such as France and
Japan compared to the United States is
quite remarkable. It leads to many international disputes regarding the appropriate scope of the copyright."

73 See id. at Appendix E. After Qllalilex Co. V. Jacobson PlOds. Co., 514 U.s. 159 (1995), the average nontrflditionaltmdemark registrations weIll from less than 2 per year to lleflrly 50 pel" yeiu: Despite this increase, nontrflditional trademarks still only comprise less
than 2/100th of a percent of the totnl trademark applicaitons. See id. at4. See also Nick Pisarsky, Nor1:~ PoTAYlo-]loTAHlo-Lct's Cail/llc
Wh(1/c Thillg Off: Trademark Pro/re/iOIl of Prot/llci Smmds, 40 CO;"'N. L. REV. 797, 803 1\.28 (2008) (showing thflt the percent of nontradltiofk11
lmdemarks tlwt cannol be perceived visually was 0.00727(1,:.).
74 Registration No. 76016924 (filed Apr. 3, 2000; abandoned Jan. 21, 2002). See also Frank "Dr. Future" Ogden's ",'ebsi!e available al
http://www.drtomorrow.com/feature/slrllightgoods.hlml (IllS! visited Sep1.15, 2010) (stilting his belief that registering his DNA gene
sequence as a trademark is necessary to prev(Ol)t "reproductiOll including the production of humans, clones, survival machines, or
futuristic animll]s").
75 Kimberly Y. \V. Holst, A Case of /lad Clt'dil?: The 1I11ilcd S/~le$ mId Ihe Prolce/ion of !l10ml RigIJ/$ it! Inlellccllml Properly Lnw, 3 BUFI'.
iNTELL. PRO», L.J. 105 (2006); Cyrill P. Rigil.lnonli, Oesconsirucii1Jg Moml j(igiJIs, 47 HARV. IN·!"L L.]. 353 (2006); Jane Ginsburg, Moml Righls
in Il COHJUJOIJ taw Syslcm, i/1 MORIIL RIGHTS PI~OTECTION IN II COl'YR1GIrr SYSTEM 18 (Peter Anderson & Oflvid Saunders eds., 1992).
76 Sheldon Hillpern, Of Moml j(iglri and Moral RigiJIc()JlSJlfSS, 1 MIIRQ.

INT~LL.

PROP. L. REV. 6S (1997).

77 MELF1LLE B. NIMMER & DIIV11) N1M),.jU~, NIMMER ON COl'YR1Glrr, § 80.D1.

(

78 J do not intend nor do J think it necessary 10 take sides in the dehate regarding whether the moral right should he protected separately front the copyrightllll\,s of IIny jurisdiction (dualist view) or Whether they should or are best conceived of as pmt of the copyright regime of ilny jmisdiction (monist view). I illn merely making the general claim that moml rights protect the personality of a
work and that trademarks in the United States have taken on u personality thill Congre"s at least seems to think is worthy of protection.
See generally, Cyrlll P. Rigamon!i, !he CO!1ccp/IlIlI THIH."lommfiou of Moml EiShls, 55 A).1. J. Cmll'. L. 67, 73-·76 (2007).
79 MELFlLLl, B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 0)\1 COPYRIGHT, §. SO.01.
80 KOllumi, K.K. v.lchiro KOlnilmi, 1696 Hamei ljho 145 (Tokyo O. Ct. Aug. 30, 1999).
81 MOllica Kililln, A Hollow Viclory fOI· !lIC Commoll Lnw? Th)!s Illid J/ic Mom/ RiShis Exc!Jlsioll, 2). MAIN!AL1- REV. lNlEL!.. PROI'. L. 321,
322 (2003) ("The continued s(]uabble over morn I rights between commolllaw and civil law countries is a stumbling block for harmoniz<1lioll of international copyrightlilws.").
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A similar distinction exists in trademark between Civil Law countries and
the United States. The trademark right in
Civil Law countries is usually justified as
a property right." It is accepted that the
trademark is subject to property ownership. Conversely, in the United States, the
trademark jurisprudence heretofore has
been recognized as a right of exclusion
based merely on priority of appropriation."' One owns the right to exclude others from marks which one has priority to,
but does not own the mark itself."'
As I predicted it would in 1994,~ the
concept of dilution has driven a major seachange in American trademark jurisprudence. The trademark right in the United
States has slowly come to be far more similar to the nature and extent of moral right
protection, rather than the mere right to
exclude. Now, the United States recognizes the personality of a trademark and
the Civil Law nations continue to recognize it as an economic right. The significance is that, once again, the Civil Law
and the United States do not share an
understanding of what a trademark right
confers. Therefore, the basis jurisprudence of American trademark law and
that of the Civil Law remains disparate.
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The moral rights doctrine is a very
broad idea that is said to protect the "personality" of a work." This doctrine gives
the author the right to claim authorship of
a work (right of attribution or right of
paternity); the right to object to changes,
modifications, or bastardizations of the a
work (right of integrity); the right share or
not share a work with the public (right of
divulgation); and the right to remove a
work from the public after publication
(right of withdrawal)," Moral rights protect the "personal, intellectual, and spiritual interests of the author."&; The notion
is that the author merges him or herself
with the work and as such the work
becomes part of their personality. As
such, just as one may not sell part of your
body, one cannot alienate a moral or personal right in a work. My contention here
is that as the trademark grows in strength
and stature, lower courts and the United
States Congress have come to protect the
mark as a personality worthy of protection as if it were a work of the creator.
As the United States trademark right
expands in scope, this notion can apply to
describe the functioning of the United
States trademark right. Although the
moral right is inalienable in most coun-

82 1 THOMAS MCCAlni-IY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 2:14 (4th cd. 2007).

83 The Trademark Cases, 100 U,S. 82, 94 (1879)("At common law the exclusive right to it grows out of its usc, and not its mere
adoption. By the act of Congress this exclusive right attaches upon registration. But in neither case does it depend upon novelty, inventiOll, discovery, or any work of the brilin. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is simply founded on
priority of appropriation.") for an excellent review of this debate, see Simone A Rose, Will Alias Sllmg? Dii!llio!1 Protection for "FamOIlS"
Trademarks: Allti-Competitive "Mollo/loly" or Eomed "Properly" Rigl!t?,47 FLA. 1.. REV. 653 (1995). See, also, David S. We!kowitz,
Rccxllminillg Trademllrk Dill/liml, 44 YAND. L. REV. 531 (1991); Milton W. rhmdlel; Arc Siale AnlidilllliOll lAWS Compali1>le witil lire Naliollal
ProteclioH Of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 271 (1985).
84 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rcctanus Co., 248 U.s. 90, 97 (1918)("There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as
a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed. The law of trade-marks is but
a part of the broader law of unfilir competition; the right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is
simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as
his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business,")

85 That a trademark dilution statute would create a copyight in trademarks that protect even the idea of a trademark, is precisely
what has happened.
86 "Work" is the term for the object of copyright protection.
87 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLOSW", O:-l COPYRIGHT §17:23, at 17:200 (3d ed. 2005); Cyri1l P. Rigamonti, Tile Conceptllill Trmrsforlllillioll of
Moral Rights, 55 AM. J. COMI'. L. 67, 70 (2007). The rights of divulgation ilnd withdrawal and not relevant to this discussion.
88 Adolf Dietz, Ailli Cmrgress: Antwerp 1993: The Moral Right of the Allthor: Moral

J.t. & ARTS 199, 207 (1995).
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tries that recognize the moral rightW and,
of course, the United States trademark is
completely alienable, moral rights actually do describe the United States trademark right as to the immediate holder of
that right, whether an original creator or
an assignee.
A member of the Berne Convention is
mandated to provide protection for two of
these moral rights (attribution and integrity)'" and most Civil Law countries do.
There is great debate about whether or not
the United States in compliance with this
requirement even though it ratified the
Berne convention in 1989."
The phrase droit moral ("moral right")
was first used as a legal term of art by the
prominent French jurist Andre Morillot in
1878." In Cinquin c. Lecocq;) before the
Cour de Cassation, Morillot asserted that
the property rights of an artistic work
under copyright was not community
property between spouses, but rather
belonged solely to the creator." This con-
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cept grew out of the philosophy of individualism that thrived in France following the French Revolution,95 Although the
court disagreed, the court did recognize
that the artist-husband alone possessed
distinct moral rights over his creation,"
Following this acknowledgment, European courts struggled over which two
German philosophies to adopt: Immanuel
Kant's monist system or Georg Wilhelm
Freidrich Hegel's dualist system." Kant's
model revolved around the concept that a
work of art is not merely an external
object, but rather is an expression of the
creator's personality."' Hegel's conception
differed in his belief that the work itself is
necessary for the manifestation of the
artist's personality; therefore the artistic
work is property to which the artist's personality is inseparably attached." In the
early 1900's, German Jurist Joseph Kohler
further developed Hegel's theories defining how an economic right in the artistic
creation may simultaneously co-exist with

"--89-id-,~;;'208; Edwilrd J. Damich, The 1«-:111 of PrJ'smmlity; A COll1l1lon--Lrlw Basis fa/' the Protec/ioll of the Moml Rights of Authors, 23 GA.
L. REV. 1, 14 (1988).
90 Berne Conven!ion for the Protection of Literilry ilnd Artistic \Vorks, ilrl. 6bis (Sept 9, 1886; revised July 24 1974 and amended
1979; entered into force for the U.S. Mil!: I, 1989 (Sen. Treaty Doc. 99-127}) U.S.T. Lexis 160 or 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715
91 ElilA1beth Dillinger, Millillllillg Pimsso: The Cnse For AmCllding Ihe Visulll Artists Rights Act 10 Pmllide Protcctioll of Moml Rights After
Dmlh, 75 UMKC L REV. 897, 906·07 (2007) ("(Ville may not be intellectually honest when we conclude thilt we can join Berne by deeming U.S. laws to be in compliance.... ") (guoling 134 Congo Rec. H3079 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (statement of Rep. Berman». William
Belanger, Article: U.S. Complillllet with the Berne COIwclI/ion, 3 Gw. MASO,\! IND. L. REV. 373, 390 (1995) ("Some commentators have suggested lhat fuJI compliance \\'ith the Berne Convention would potentially violate the COJlstitution.").
92 Edward J. Damicll, The Righi of Personality: A COll/IIIOIl-LaW Basis for Ihe Protcctioll of the Moml Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. I,
29 (l988); Cheri), Swack, Saft'gJlardil1g Artistic Crcnliolll1nd fhe Cultural He!"ilagc: A Comparison of Dmil Mornl Bc/W£C11 France alld tlJe Uniled
Sllltes, 22 COLliM.-VLA J-L. & ARTS 361, 373 (1998).
93 Civ., June 25, 1902, D.P. 1903.1.5.

94 WilIinn1 Strauss, Mornl Righ/s of ille Aliliror, 4 AM. J. COMI'. L. 506, 513 11.3] (1955).
95 Laura Lee Van VeJzen, Injedillg II DO$c of Duly il1/o Ihe Doc/ril1l! of Droit MomL 74 Iowa L. Rev. 629, 632-33 (1989); DaSilva, Droil
Moml alld the Amoral CopyrigM: A Comparison of Ar/isls' Rights ill France and tlJe United Slates, 28 BULL. COI'YlllGllT Soc'y U.S.A. 1,9 (1980).

96 Edward Dall1ich, The Rig/I/ of Pasoualily: A COIIIIIIO!1LaW Basis for Ihe Pm/fetiOiI of IIle Moml RiglJls of Autllors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1,29
(J988)
97 DaSilva, Droil Moml aud tlie Amoml Copyright: A Comparison of Artisls' Rights ill Frl1l1Ce l1Iult/Je Uniled Siales, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SOC'y U.S.A. 1, 12n.85 (198OJ.
98 Cherly Swnck, SafegllllrdillS Arlisti("Crealion (/ud the Odlurnl Heritage: A Com/larison of Droit Moml Be/ween hallcc and the Uniled
Slates, 22 COUJM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 361, 370-71 0998).
99 Id. at 371.
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the personal rights in its creator.'"" Morillot
argued under the dualist concept, and
after court's decision in Cinquin C. Lecocq
this notion prevailed in France. '"
Some moral rights scholars would dismiss the argument that trademarks in the
United States have become subject to protection akin to moral rights out of hand.'"'
However, those who dismiss are talking
about what trademark jurisprudence formerly was or what it ought to be, not what
it has become.

A. Attribution
The moral right of attribution is "perhaps
the most important moral right.""3 The
right of attribution allows an author to
claim a work as their own. This claim
gives an author the ability to object, essentially, to a likelihood of confusion'"' over
the source of a work. In Europe, this is
known as the right of paternity. '03 It allows
an author to claim or not claim that
he/ she is the author of any given work.
This is most analogous to the source
denoting function in trademarks. The
source denoting function tells a purchaser

JPTOS

from where a product emanates. In fact,
"[ilt is the source-denoting function that
trademark laws protect, and nothing
more."'" As we shall see, the American
trademark right has come to protect far
more than the mere source denoting
capacity of the trademark.
The right of attribution first had roots in
ancient Rome, which recognized the
growing problem of plagiarism. '" To provide relief to the angry authors, a cause of
action known as plagium, meaning "the
crime of stealing a human being" was created in the first century A.D."" As the
Roman Empire declined and Europe
plunged into the dark ages, these concepts
bowed to the authority of the Catholic
Church, which gave little or no attribution
to individual artists."" It wasn't until the
Renaissance era when these rights began
to reappear.""
In 1498 Michelangelo Buonarroti was
commissioned by a French cardinal to create La Piela, depicting the body of Jesus on
the lap of his mother Mary after the Crucifixion, as a tomb monument in the
chapel of St. Maria della Febbre in St.

100 rd. ill 372.

101 Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Mornl Rights Pro/celion ill tile lIlli/cd Sillies Ullder the Berne Convention: A Fictional iVork?, 12 FORDHA~l
INTELL. PROP. MEDlA & ENT. L.J. 1203,1211-12 (2002).
102 ROBERTA ROSEt>.THAL KWALL, THE SoUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING II MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR TIlE UNITED STATF.5 88-89

(2010)("Trademark law is concerned wilh preventing consumer conhlsion, a concept totally unrelated to the authorial interests encompassed by moral rights."),
103 Cyril! P. RigiuHonti, DecmJstrJlcliJ1g Moml RigiJIs, 471-l:\RV. INT'L. L.J. 353, 364 (200b).
104 Rohert C. Bird, Moral niglits: Diagnosis Illld J(l'linbilillltimJ, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 407, 440 (2009).

105 Dan L. Burk, Copyrigilllllll/ Feminism ill Digital Medill, 14 Am. U. j. GE'WEI( Soc. POL'y & L. 519, 545-547 (2006).
106 Anti-Monopoly Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Clr. 1979).
107 Bird, Sllpra note 102, at 413.
lOS See Cheryl Swack, Safegllardillg Artistic Creation mid the Cllltllral Heritage: A ComparisOIl of Droit Moral Be/weel1 FmJlceand the
United Stales, 22 COLUM.-VLA j.L. & AIm 361, 367-68 (1998).
109 Alicia Maria LaTores, Luca della Robbia as Maiolica Producer: Artists and Artisans in fifteenth-Century Florence, (May 5,2009)
(\'Vheaton College), available at http://dspace.nitle.org/bitstream/handle/J0090/8394/1atores%20-%20thesis%20-%2009.pdf?
sequence=l.
110 Set' Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convention: A Fictional \'1'ork?, 12
FORDIIA~f INTELI.. PROI'. MEOlA & E"'T. L.J. 1203, 1206 (2002).
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Peter's Basilica. The work was instantly
recognized as one of the greatest sculptures ever created, but when a group
of locals crowded in admiration,
Michelangelo overheard one of them credit the work to Cristofaro Solari, another
sculptor.'" That night, under the cover of
darkness, Michelangelo crept back into
the church and asserted his right of attribution by carving MICHAELA[N]GELUS
BONAROTUS FLORENTIN[US] FACIEBA[T] ("Michelangelo Buonarroti, Florentine, made this") on the sash running
across Mary's chest. '" This was the only
work he ever signed.'"
The trademark right of source denoting
has become analogous to the moral right
of attribution. Today, when trademark
users apply their marks to their goods or
services, trademark jurisprudence supports their claim as if it were carved in
stone. Source denoting has become much
more signficant than merely letting consumers know from where a product eminates. Now, a famous mark can exclude
all uses of noncompeting marks that do no
confuse. Now, a holder of a trademark
can prevent its registration as a domain
name even if there is no confusion. Since
the inception of incontestability, the holder of an incontestable mark may prevent
others from using it even if it merely
descriptive and therefore no trademark at
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all. In this way, holders of trademarks
have come to hold something that seems
akin to the moral right of attribution for
their marks.

B. Integrity
The moral right of integrity protects a
copyrighted work from change or mutilation. This gives authors the exclusive
right to display their work in the original
form and protects against any distortion
of that original expression. '" "To deform
his work is to present him to the public as
the creator of a work not his own, and
thus makes him subject to criticism for
work he has not done."'"
The best example of the right of integrity in operation is the battle over the colorization of movies. When a French television station, La Cinq, gained purported
rights (from an assignee of the copyrights)
to colorize John Huston's The Asphalt
Jungle, his heirs filed suit claiming a violation of their father's moral right of integrity.'" Although Huston's heirs lost the case
at the lower court because the court found
that the television company did not colorize the original copy of the movie,''' the
French Supreme Court reversed and
found Huston's right of integrity
infringed because Huston had created the
The Court ordered some
movie. '"

111 V',!ILUAM E. \/"IIILLACE, LIFE liND EARLY WORKS, 223 (Routledge 1995).
112 See id; see also GIORGIO VASAR1, TilE liVES 0)' THE PAINTERS, ScULJ>lDRS AND

ARCHITECTS (AB Hinds ed. 1927).

113 Aileen June Wang, Michelangelo's Siglla/lIre, thc Si:dcc!1th Cell/my JOllnlal, Vol. 35, No.2, 447-473 (2004) available at
http://www.jstor.org/ stilble/20476944.
114 Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Tile Moml Rigllt of IIltegrily: A Freedom of ExpressiOlI, ill 2 NEW DIRECTIONSlN COPYRIGHT 150 (Fiona
Macmillan cd., 2006).

lIS Martin A. Roeder, The Doc/rille of Moml Right, 53 HAIl\'. L. RIN. 554, 569 (1940).
116 Casso Ie civ., May 28, 1991, IUOA 1991, 149, 197.
117 ld. The lower court also refused to grant relief daiming that Huston signed aWilY his authorship rights in a contract with the
film producer valid under American WI'.'. Alexander Gigante, Ice Patch 011 fhe ll1forlllalioll SlIperhighway: Forrigl! Liability for Domestimlly
CI'e{l/ed COlltCIII, 14 CAiUX)7..0 Al<TS & ENT. LJ 523, 535 (1996).

118 Casso Ie eiv., Dec. 19, 1994, R.LDA 1995,164,389. This would not hilve been the outcome in the United Stales as there is no pro·
tection for someone like John Houston who did not own the copyright to his work. Jimmy A. Frazier, Comment, 011 Mornl Rights, ArtistCenlered l-,'gisla/ioll, aJld the Nokof the Siale ill Arl Worlds: Noles 011 BllildillS 1/ Sociology of Copyrighl Law, 70 TuL. L. REV, 313, 315 (J995).
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$100,000 in damages to be paid to the
Huston heirs and that the colorized film
be destroyed.'"
The right of integrity is very analogous
to the dilution prevention right in trademark law."o For example, a Paris District
Court prohibited a director from putting
on the play, Waiting for Godat, casting all
actresses because it interfered with the
playwright's intention that the roles be
played by men.'" The court's decision
was grounded in the desire to protect the
playwright's moral right of integrity
which would have been violated had the
director tainted the nature of the play by
using all actresses.'''
Also, an Indian court found that the
destruction of a publically recognized
sculpture amounted to mutilation of the
sculptural work and consequently a violation of his moral right of integrity regardless of the location at which the destruction took place.'''
The right of integrity is very analogous
to the dilution right in the United States.
Now, selling Kodak brand pianos violates
the integrity of the famous Kodak brand.

JPTOS

The mere fact that another Kodak is on the
market lessens the capacity of Kodak to
distinguish itself in the minds of potential
consumers, just as a moral right artist has
the right to protect the integrity of his/her
work. Buick brand aspirin, we are told in
the legislative history, dilutes the famous
mark for an automobile. If Buick can prevent a third party from naming their
aspirin "BUICK", far more is going on
than the right of exclusion. Here, it is only
theoretically justified if one accepts that
the automobile manufacturer's right of
integrity is being violated. That is, the
very integrity of the aura surrounding the
mark BUICK is destroyed. When the
association is made with aspirin, the former distinctiveness of the mark BUICK is
lessened (or destroyed). To allow the
owner of BUICK to prevent this destruction allows that entity the right to prevent
damage to the integrity of the mark.
As such, the trademark BUICK is now
protected as if it were appropriate subject
matter of the moral right of integrity.

119 The Huston heirs were awarded $74,000 from Turner Entert,linment and $37,000 from France's Channel 5. Fiml Filled [or
Colorizing 'Jungle', ROCKY MNT. NEWS, Dec. 29, 1994 at 16D.

120 Bird, Slipra note 102, at 439.

121 Tribunal de gr<1nde instance IT.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 3e ch" Oct. 15, 1992, IUD.A. 1993, 155, 225;
See Jean-LtK Piotraut, All AII/hors' Rights-Based CWI/rightl..!lw: The Faimess mid Morality of Frellcli alld Amel'i(mll.mv COHlJ1ared, 24
CAI<DOZQ ARTS & ENT. L.j, 549, 605 (2006).
122 Although this action W(lS brought by the estate of playwright Samuel Beckett, during his lifetime he denied (Ill requests for
permission to deviate from the all male cast except one. The only exception was for Frau Osterkamp who wanted to lise a female cast
for a production at the 1982 Berlin Festival. Beckett's authorization waS conditioned on Ihe audience's understanding of his complete
disapproval of the modification. Later in 1988, a Dutch theater produced the play with (I female cast and wilhout Beckett's permission.
\'Vhen Beckett pursued legal action in the Netherlands, the judge ruled in favor of mixed gender casting and found the play to have
been true to its original form despite induding women. Outraged at this result, Beckett banned production of all of his plays in the
Netherlands and amended his contracts with other countries 10 disallow any modifications to the play Or the stil.ge directions. See
"VILLlA),1 HUTCHINGS, SAMUEL BECKEn's WAtTtl'-iG FOR GODOT: A REFEllENO; GUIDE 93 (Pr(leg0r Publishers 2005).
123 In addition to the artist's moral right of integrity, the cOllrt held that mutilation of the sculpture violated the integrity of the
piece in rel(llion to Indian culture because the sculpture had become a public emblem of indian heritage. Sehgal v. Union of India
(2010) 39 r.S.R 830 (2005).
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A. Dilution
Primarily at the Supreme Court level,
there has been much tension between the
Court and Congress as to the scope of the
trademark. The best example of this is the
Victoria's Secret case.''' In that case, the
Supreme Court held that a claimant of
dilution had to show that its mark was
"actually diluted," a "likelihood of dilution" was not enough.''' Without saying
what precisely (other than a presumption
that absolute identical marks would be
enough)'" constituted "actual dilution,"
the Court changed the analysis of when a
trademark right was harmed. Up to that
point, the test had always been a "likeli-
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hood" of infringement. To change this to
a requirement that the claimant had to
show evidence of actual harm, when the
alleged harm from dilution is remarkably
speculative at best, was to nearly extinguish the cause of action. In the reported
cases, after the Victoria Secret case, the
number of cases plummeted.'"
However, Congress, at the behest of
Limited Brands, Inc., Victoria's Secret' PAC
and Jack Valenti,''' the most influential lobbyist in the 2006 election year, expressly
overruled the Supreme Court in the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA)
of 2006.'" According to the TDRA, the
appropriate standard of when a mark is
diluted is now a "likelihood of dilution."""
Not surprisingly, the number of cases
based on a dilution claim has rebounded. '"

124 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.s. 418 (2003). In the opinion the court went out of its way to hint that "expansion of
tmdemmk law beyond its usual bottndnries was not the product of a careful legislative process that considered its effect on other inteliectu;;ll property regimes." Dflvid S. Welkowitz, The Sllprcml' Courl mid Trademark Lnw ill tile New MillcJUlill1l1, 30 WM. MITCI-lELL L REV.
1659,1700 (2004). See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429 ("Unlike traditional infringement luw, the prohibitions against trademark dilution me not
the product of common-law development, and are not motivilted by an interest in protecting consumers."). The opinion goes on to discuss how dilution was first considered in 1988, but W<1S deleted for concems of non-compatibility with the First Amendment When the
dilution was finally added in 1995, the he<lring was limited to a single day <1nd no opposition to the bill W<1S wised. Id. at 431.
125 Id. at 433 (stating that ambiguity within 15 U.s.C §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127 confirmed "the {Supreme Court's] conclusion that actual
dllution must be established.").

126 Jd. at 434 ("[DJirect evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be
proven through circumstantial evidence - the obvious case is one where the junior <1ud senior marks are identical."). "[M]ental association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the fMl\OUS mm"k. ..." Id.
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127 See Marc L. De!f1ache, Sarah Silbert, Christina Hillson, Article: Lifc Aftcr MO$e/c.ll: The Trademark Dilulion Revision Act, 16 TEX.
L.J. 125,149-50 (2007) (st(lling th(lt in the late 1990s there was a ne(lrly 100o/c. increase in trademark dilution l(l\\'suits; after
Moseley it became much more difficult for mark owners to prove dilution). Between 1997 and 2003, there W(lS an average of twentyfour federal dilution C<1ses per year. Following Moseley, but prior to the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, the number of federal
dilution lawsuits dropped to illl ,wemge of just 8.5 pef yeM. See Tile IViliiml1 Mitchell Study 0I11)'ademark 1.itigatioH( <1vailable at
http:// WIVW. wmi tchell.ed ul intellectual-property IMitchell-Study-on-Trademark-Litigation/.
128 See Michael A. Carrier, CalJiulllg blltllectual Pl"OflL'rty Throllgh a Propcl"ly Paradigm,54 DUKE L.J. 1, 11 n.15 (2004) (discussing Jack
Valenti's role in the "propertization" of intellectu<1l property); Erika Overby, A N<1tion of Whimps: the Polllics of Dilution Law (student
paper on file with the author).
INTELL. PRO)'.

129 Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2,120 Stat. 1730,1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 1125(c) (2006».
130 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264 n.2 (4th Cil: 2007) ("Congressmnended the [TRDA]
principally to overrule Mose/I'Y and to rcqtlire that only <1 likelihood of dilution need be proved."). See (llso V Secret C<1t(llogue, Inc. v.
Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cif. 2010) «affirming summary judgment for Victoria's Secret; after twelveyenrs in the legal system, finally
the case is closed). ''The provisions of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.CS. § 1125(c), change the test for dilution by
tarnishment from an '<lclual' to only a likelihood of 'harm' to the 'reputation' of thl' s('nior mark." Jd. at 385 n.l.
131 By 2007 the number of feder<1l dilution lawsuits nearly tripled, going from an average of 8.5 cases to twenty-one cases per year.
See The Williaw Mitchell Stud!! 011 Trademark Litigation, available at http://www.wmitcheH.edu/intellectui1l-propCl1y IMitchell-Study-onTl"tIdemark-Litigation/.
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B. Fair Use
In KP Permanent Makeup v. Lasting
Impressions I, Inc.,'" the Supreme Court
attempted to further restrict the expansion
of the trademark right. There, the Court
held that fair use (and therefore a finding
of non-infringement) consisted of conduct
where a third party used a descriptive
mark descriptively.'" If this happened,
there would be no infringement and the
defendant would not be required to make
a showing of a lack of confusion. '"
The fair use doctrine is yet to be countered by Congress. Perhaps they agree;
perhaps there are more important issues
on their plate. Regardless, the fair use
doctrine may operate to provide the
brake to the expansion of trademark
jurisprudence that is required if we are to
maintain balance between trademark
holders and consumers. n·.
132 543

JPTOS

C Courts Resist; Congress Favors
Historically, lower courts were hesitant to
expand trademark jurisprudence in the
United States to the extent that Congress
seemed to require.
In Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,''" the Second
Circuit overturned a finding of dilution
because the marks LEXUS and LEXIS
were not similar enough. m In Fruit of the
Loom, Inc. v. Girouard,''' the Ninth Circuit
refused to find a violation of the dilution
act because FRUIT OF THE LOOM was
not famous enough.'"
Over the 60 history of the Lanham Act,
the total number cases that were reported
peeked in 2002 at 101 cases.''' By 2006, this
number had dropped to 53.''' The
amounts of total damages and total attorney fees awarded has continued to decline
since 2000'''' even though the total number

u.s. 1ll (2004).

133 Allhough Lasting Impression I, Inc. had obtained incontestability on its trademark consisting of the words "Micro Colors,"
relying on 15 US.c. § 1115(b)(4), KP Permilnent Milke-Up, Illc. ("KP") maint<1ined tlwt their use of the same words in <1n <1dvertisement
did not constitute infringement because the words were necessary to <1ccur<1tE'ly describe their product. The Supreme Court ilgreed
with KP, ruling th<1t such iluse is fair. Id. at 114-15. See Sue Ann Mota, Arlie/I': KP PemlrlllcHt Make·Up v. 1.aslillS Impressioll·~·Thc

Sialulory Defeusc of Fair Usc is AvailaMe iu Trademark Infrillgement Ca$('$ Without Negating Ow Likelihood of COnSIlIl11.'1' ConfllsioJ!, According fo
lile Slipreme Caliri, 39 VAl.. V.L. REV. 327, 335 (2004) ("[T]l\e Lanham Act was not nW<1nt to deprive commerci<11 spenkers of the ordinary
use of descriptive words.").
134 "[A] plaintiff claiming infringement of an incontestable m<1rk must show likelihood of consumer confusion ilS part of the prima
filcie Cilse ... the defendant hilS no independent burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion in filising the affirmative defense that a
term is used descriptively, not ilS il m<lrk, fairly, and in good filith ..." KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 V.s. al 124. Nalurnny, it is only
ilfler the plilintiff hilS made a prima facie showing that a defendant has a need for <1n affirmative defense. Id. at 120. Requiring the
defendant to prove that the plaintiff cannot prove il required element prior to qualifying for the statutory defense is no defense at ali,
ilnd simply "would make no sense." Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that there WilS no other logical way to interpret 15 V.s,c.
§ 1115(b)(4). Id.
135 DilVid S. We!kowitz, The SlIprcme COllrl alld '/lndemark I.nlll ililhe New Mil/emlilllll, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659, 1700 (2004)
("ITJhe Court may be signaling [hilt there Me limits to Congress's power to regul<lte these areas under the Commerce Clause, as
opposed to the Patent and Copyright Clause.").
136 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
137 See id. at 1031 ("'Dilution theory presumes some kind of mental association in the reilsollilble buyer'S mind between the two
parties' uses of the mmk' .... Howevel~ if a mark circulates only in a limited market, it is unlikely to be <lssociated generally with the
mark for a dissimilar product circulating elsewhere.") (quoting 2 J. MCCARTI'IY, TRAl)nlr\I~Ks M-il) VNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.13 <It 213-1·1).
138 994 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir.1993).
139 ld. (finding thilt the Defendant's thongs <1nd "bustlers" adorned with plastic fruit and whimsicil!ly nilmed "fruit flops" and
"fruit cups," did not dilute the "Fruit of the Loom" l1l<lrk). The generiC term "fruit" alone is not f<1mOllS enough to wmrant protection.
"Fruit of the Loom" gets its special force from the combination of the words "fruil" and "loom" used together. ld. at 1362.
140 See The William Mile/iell Col/CSt' of Law Study 011 Trademark Litigatioll, Graph A: Total Numbl'r of Reported Cilses pef Yeilr,
http://wwlI'.wmitcheILedu/intelleclual-proper!y/fiIes/WM-TMStudy·GraphA.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Grilph AJ.

141 !d.
142 See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark E:aorli1m: Tht' Elld o/,n'adCllwk {.nw, 65 WA~I-I & LEE L REV. 585, 622-24 (2008) [hereinafter Port,
'fi'adell1r11'k £xlorlitlllJ (interpreting the data collected by the \Vi!liam Mitchell Study on the number oi cases reported).
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of cases filed continues to increase. ")
Although I have posited that the reason
for this precipitous decline may be the fact
that trademark owners are being over
aggressive in filing law suits and thereby
leading to many settlements,'" it may also
be that the plaintiffs are settling the claims
because they lack confidence in a litigated
outcome. One way or the other, the data
indicates that most cases end in a settlement. Only 1.3% of all filed cases end in a
trial on the merits."'; Perhaps the reason
for such a high volume of filed claims and
a low volume of fully litigated claims is
uncertainty by both sides regarding what
the precise parameters are of American
trademark jurisprudence.
Of course, the tension between the
Supreme Court and Congress regarding
trademark jurisprudence is rather obvious. There have been many cases from
Supreme Court in the last two decades.
After culminating in the high water mark
of Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.""
in 1992 and Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
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Products Co. Inc.'" in 1995, there has been
a clear retrenchment of the expansion of
trademark rights by the Supreme Cour!.'"
First, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Brothers, Inc.'·10 in 2000, Wal-mart had
intentionally and specifically usurped
Samara's design for children's clothing.
Wal-mart sent pictures of Samara's clothing to its designer in the Philippines with
instructions to copy it.'~ In many of the
pictures, Samara's label was visible and
Samara's trademark was apparent.'" Yet,
the Court found that the Lanham Act was
not infringed because Samara's clothing
had not attained a secondary meaning in
the market place. ,,, The Court dismissed
Samara's claim in a short, 11 page opinion
and created new categories for trade dress
protection. They determined that there
were three types of trade dress: product
design, product packaging, and a tertium
quid.'" As Samara's claim was categorized
as product design, they were required to
show secondary meaning where product
packaging is protected without secondary
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143 Id. at 623, See also T/I~ ''','i/liml! Mitchdl (()/lege of Law Study (111 1radcllwk Litigatioll, Graph L: 'Iota! Number of Initial Claims of
Infringement per Year, http://wwwwmilchelLC!du/intellcc\ual-property /files/V1lM-TMStudy-GrilphL.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
144 See Port, 1hlrlrWII1'k Exiorliml, supra note 142, at 633 (riting trademark extortion as the reason why the number of d()ims is rising while the dillMges awarded by the coml" steadily decreases). Trademark extortion is the filing of a case that may not succeed on
ils merits with the goal of reaching an out of court settlement. Jd.
145 Jd. at 628. See illsa id. at 622 (noting that on avcr,1ge, ill trial, trademark holders have roughly a 55% chance of obtaining an
injunction, and only about il 55'!,-. chance of receiving d"mages).
146 505 U.s. 763 (1992).

147 514 U.s. 159 (1995).
cen the two
lly with the

.13 <11213-14).

148 Sheldon W. Halpern, Tmffickiug in TmaclHm'k$: Sell iug BOlillaaries for file Ulleasy /l.dalio!lfii1ip Betweell "Property Riglits" alia
TmaclIlIlrk aIlil Pilliliciiy Rigilts, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1019-20 (2009) (stalin!; th,,! generally the five Supreme Court !r"demmk opinions
in the last decade, <lnd speCifically Wal-m<lll <lnd TrMFix, "<lllempt to inhibit the prospect of tradClll<1fk law impinging on the bound<lries and limitiltions of pillent law.... ") .

149 529 U.s. 205 (2000).

flops" and
!'It protection.

2.
er Year,
,rGniphA].

·reinafLer Port,

150 ld. ilt 207. The designer /manuf"ctmer, Judy-Philippine, Inc., copied il total of 16 of &1111<1m'S gmJn<'nls with only lllinor modifications in the design. In 1996, Wal·Milrl sold the knockoffs at a 101\'e)" price Ih<lll th<lt of Salllilra (whose product line was featured in
JC Penney), generating more limn $LlS million in gross profits. Id.

151 Smnara Bros. v. \Val-M<lrt Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Or. 1998).
152 \<\'al-M"rt Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213.
153 Id. [Ij 215 (explaining th"t <lllhough Two Pesos, Inc. v. laca Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S, 763 (1992) established that tr,1de dress can be
held as distinctive without secondary meaning, Taco C<lbana's trade dress differed from Sm11<lra'S because the decor of a restaurant is
either product packaging or latiulil qlll'a (i.e., the decor cannot be clM,sified exclusively <lS either design or packaging).
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meaning.'" The tertium quid doesn't stand
up to any sophisticated analysis.
Next, in TrafFix Devices Inc v.
Marketing Displays Inc.,''' in 2001, the
Supreme Court held that road-side signs
with spring loaded legs so they would
stand up in the wind were functional and
therefore not protectable trade dress. The
Court held that the claimed trade dress
was function because it was "essential to
the use or purpose of the article."""
Through the functionality doctrine, the
Supreme Court greatly restricted the
expansion of the trademark right.
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp.,''' the Court found that
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act could not
operate as an alternative to copyright protection even though the plaintiff could
establish that it was the successor in interest to the actual source of the video.'~
In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., ,;9
also in 2003, the Supreme Court held that
the appropriate standard for a finding of
trademark dilution was "actual dilution"
rather than the far lesser standard of a
"likelihood" of dilution. The Court resolved a debate regarding interpretation
of the Lanham Act and whether the stan-

JPTQS
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dard for dilution should be the same as
the standard for infringement. The Court
elected to use the higher standard and
require actual harm to be show whether
than a merely likelihood, the standard
for infringement.
Finally, in 2004, in KP Permanent MakeUp, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,''' the
Court again restricted the trademark right
at issue and determined that a regLstered
trademark that was descriptive had to
endure other fair uses of that mark so long
as they amounted to a descriptive mark
being used descriptively.
Therefore, put in this light, it is clear
tha t the Supreme Court in the last decade
has been attempting to reign in the trademark right.
In the mean time, Congress continues
to expand trademark jurisprudence.
Congress passed first the lTU statute,
where a party's mere intent to use a mark
can be preserved for three years.'"'
Congress passed the original dilution
statute'" and then the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act'" which expressly
overruled the Victoria's Secret case.""
Congress created the ACPA,'65 allOWing,
for the first time in American history,

jt
a
t

154 Id. at 216. See also id. at 213. ("In the case of product design ... we think consumer predisposition to equate the feature with
the source does not exist., . Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition Ivith regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves ...")
155 532 U,S. 23 (2001).
156 \d. at 32 (quoting Inwood Labomtories, Inc. v. lves Laboratories, Inc., 456 US, 844, 850, n.l0 (1982)).
157 539 US. 23 (2003).
158 See id. at 37 (explaining that if the Lanham Act were interpreted to include protection of the originators of the video, rather
than just those who produce reproductions of it for &1Ie, § 43(a) would allow perpetI1"\ patents nnd copyrights-which is prohibited by
wngress).
159 537 U.s. 418 (2003). See supra text nccompanyillg notes 123, 126.
160 543 U.S. III (2004). See slWm text accolllpnnyillg notes 132-\33.
161 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-667, ]02 Stat. 3935 (1988) (codified at 15 U.s.c. § 1051 (2000)).
162 Federal Trndemark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stnt. 985 (1996) (originally codified at 15 U.s.c. § 1051, 1125,
1127 (1996), amended in 2006).
163 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Slat. 1730 (2006) (codified at 15 US.c. § 112S(c) (2006) and
replacing the Federal Tradelllilrk Dilutioll Act, Pub. L. 104-98).
1M Moseley \" V Secret Catalogue, Inc,537 US. 418 (2003).
165 Anticybersguatting Consltmer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (999) (codified in scattered sections of 15 US.c.).
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jurisdiction for a trademark cause of
action to be found in rem."" Additionally,
the new act also contains provisions for
statutory damages. ," Never before in the
history of the United States had i11 rem
jurisdiction for any trademark related
cause of action been recognized. Never
before in the history of the United States
has statutory damages been recognized
in a trademark case.
Therefore, it is safe to say that the
Supreme Court and the United States
Congress do not agree on the appropriate
scope of trademark protection or, more
generally, on precisely what the parameters of trademark jurisprudence are.

v. Normative Result: The
US Protects the Personality
of a Trademarkt
Therefore, the result of this is that the
lower courts have been forced by
Congress to recognize a new breed of
trademark jurisprudence. This new breed
of trademark jurisprudence is not set
upon the trademark right being a right of
exclusion where the claimant is allowed
to enforce a mark to the extent that they
use it and as long as they use it. This
used to be called the Law and Prophets of
trademark jurisprudence."~
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Instead, today, the personality of the
trademark is protected. The source denoting function of trademark protection has
been usurped by Congress. That right is
now better described as the right of attribution. Trademark owners are no longer
the owner of just a right to exclude others
to the extent they use the mark and for as
long as they use the mark. Now, the
source denoting function of a mark has
become a moral right of attribution: a personal right of the holder of the trademark.
When a famous mark is used on unrelated goods today, Congress and the lower
courts claim that the mark as been diluted.
However, there is no conceptual justification under the original trademark
jurisprudence in the United States to support the notion of trademark dilution. ,;0 It
is fully supported if one accepts the moral
right of integrity of a mark. Under this
notion, any subsequent use by anyone on
unrelated goods operates just like the
moral right of integrity. The trademark
owner has the absolute right to protect the
integrity (Congress this the protection of
distinctiveness)"" of its mark.
Therefore, the nature of trademark
jurisprudence in America has changed. In
the times of Learned Hand, it was a mere
tort where harm in the form of confusion
had to be alleged and proved before

166 See 15 us.c. § 1125(d)(2) (2006).
167 See 15 U.S.C § lJl7(d) (2006).

168 Yale EJec. Corp. v. l~ober!sol\, 26 F,2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928) ("The lilw of unfair trade comes down very nearly to this-as judges
lHlve repeated ag<1in and again-that one merchant sll<l1l1101 diver! customers from another by representing what he sells as em<ln<lting
from the second. This has been, ,md perhaps eVe!l more no\\' is, the whole L1W and the Prophets on the subject though it assumes IllallY
guises."),
169 Mosele)' v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U,$. 418, 429 (2003) ("Unlike traditional in(ringenWll[ law, the prohibitions against
trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated an interest in protecting the consumers.");
see also, Delflache supra note 126, at 126 kiting the 1927 Harvard Law l~eview article written by Frank L Scheeler on which the foundation of our modern trademark theory lies).

170 The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 explicitly provides protection for marks which are either inherently distinctive or
those which have acquired distinctiveness, from dilution or diminishment of that distinctive quality. 15 US.c. § 1125(c) (Lanham Act
§ 42). Likewise, the moral right of integrity serves the sole purpose of protecting that same distinctive quality by limiting the publiC'S
ability to alter a given work. BLACK'S LAW DICl'JO;-;'Al<Y 675 (8th ed. 2004).
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recovery could be had. Today, the personality of the mark is protected. The trademark holder's personality (in the form of
reputation) has merged with the expression of its trademark.
The primary problem with this is that
the Constitution upon which the federal
trademark right is based'" has not changed
while the trademark right has gone
through this metamorphosis. The Commerce Clause, has not changed. Therefore,
actual commerce is still constitutionally
required before federal trademark protection is authorized. Although the Lanham
Act was selectively amended to make this
metamorphosis possible, neither the legislative history nor the fundamental
aspects of the Lanham Act have changed.
If the a trademark metamorphosis was
desired, our society ought to go through
some thought and introspection regarding
the appropriate scope of trademark protection. The Lanham Act should not be
changed to simply be responsive to some
lobbyist's demands'" or some specific
company or industry's concerns.'" The
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appropriate scope of trademark protection affects us all.'" As such, we all ought
to be involved in the discussion, not just
some Congresspeople who become convinced that some element of the Lanham
Act needs tweaking. Over the last 20
years, this tweaking has transformed
trademark jurisprudence in the United
States from a tort in the form of a right of
exclusion to an inalienable moral right
where the personality of the trademark
has an existence and that existence is
ascribed to the holder of the mark and is
protected as such.
The net result of the various amendments and the various lower court opinions is that the trademark right has been
transformed. The lower courts have plenty of direction from the Supreme Court
that the expansion of trademark jurisprudence should be slowed down. However,
the lower courts seem to be embracing the
notion of expansion of trademark rights
focusing, instead, on the will of Congress
even beyond what is literally required by
the Lanham Act. '"

171 U.s. CO:-.lsr. art. i, § 8, d, 3.
172 The rcasons suggested by manufacturers for extending protection of their famolls ll\(Irks were "(1) they had invested time and
effort in cultivation these ["molls !l\ilrk and thus deserved l('gill protectioni and (2) other countries alrcildy had such prohibition iJl\d it
was important tlwt the United Slates no! lag behind any nation in the strength of its intellectual-proper!y proetctions." William W.
Fisher III, Gcisliges EiscnillJll'rill allSIIfemder l~echls/Jacicll: Die Gcscllichle des ldcCIIsclllllzc$ ill dell VerriniglNI 51aaleli ill figcH/llm im illtcrlIalionale/l Vagldch [Tile Grow/l! of lute/lcc/lwl Properly: A I lis/ory of Ihe OwnCfship of ld('tls ill IIJI' lIlIilcd Siales], V,\NDr:NI {OECK & RUf'RECI n
265, 283 (1999) (ERG); see H.K REI'. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 1029, 1030 (noting the 'substantial investJnrnl' made by various famoHs mark holders as a reason for the legislation).
173 Creative industries stich as film production, new product development, publishers, and the like (lfe constmllly pushing for
increased intellectual property protection as their profitability heavily depends upon it. William W. Fisher !Il, G1'isl(~t's [(~t'I1IU1l1-dll
allslIfcmrlcr Necillsbt'l"eicl!: Die Gescllichle des Ideellsciwtzcs ill dell VcreinigfclI Slaa/en in Eigentlml illl ill/emaljona/tII Velsldeli !Jile Growill of
liJlellccfual Property: A /-lis/my of Ille O,mwrship of Ideas ill the UHilcd Slates], VANDENHOECK & RUl'llECHT 265, 283 (1999) (F.R.G).
174 How and to what end the scope of trademark protection affects ali individuals of society is debatable yet the fact that it does is
undeniable. Compare Deborah R. Gerhardl, Cmlsmllcr hwes/melll ill TmdclI1ark, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427 (2010) (arguing that the public interest d('servcs more consideration when deciding trademark matters for the investment made by consumer through brand loyalty), and
Kristan Friday, Does Dill/tioll Make Tmdcmarks i/ltO UllcOJlsliluliollll1 PIl/('II/S?, 12 J. CO,'HEMP. LEG,,!.ISSIJES 180, 181 (stating that the FTDA
a\lthorizes a legal monopoly on a mark and impairs others ability to make use of that mark), with Mathias Strassel; The RaliOJII1/ /3l1si;; of
J)wiemark Protectioll Reuisiffd: Plltting the Dilu/ioll Doc/rille into COII/I.'X/, 10 fOIWIIAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 375, 425 (2000)
(arguing that for trademarks to continue to fulfill their economic ptlrpose, protection against dilution is essential despite the potential
anti-competitive result).
175 Lower courts are exp<lllding trademark rights by redefining trademark use, Stephanie Yti Lim, Comment, Gm Google /)1.' Liable for
1)·adcmllrk Infrigelllelll? A l.ook allhe "Trademark Use" Reqllircl11cll/ as Applied 10 Goog!;! Awords, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 265, 278, (2007) kiting
Google v. American mind, No. C 03·05340 JI~ 2005 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 6228 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005), by extending the concept of actionable
consumer confusion, and by widening the class of people who can be held accountable for consumer confusion. Stacey L Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, Tmdcmark ill TmJJ~ilioJJ Institllie for IlIlellcclllal Properly & Informntioll lAw Symposium, 41 Hous. L. REV. 777, 777 (200-1).
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THE EXPANSION TRAJECTORY:",

Trademark rights in the United States
continue to expand, The incontestability
provisions of the original Lanham Act
were an expansion not known to the
The ITU provisions,
common law
where an applicant can register his/her
intent to use a trademark without
actually doing so, changes the nature of
the trademark system in the United
States which, for over 200 years, has
required actual commerce prior to
Congressional action to provide federal
trademark protection,
Dilution law
further extends the trademark right and
allows trademark holders to prevent use
of their mark by noncompetitors on
noncompeting goods, Section 43(a) has
gradually expanded over the entire life
of the Lanham Act to now not only
protect color alone as a trademark but
even such things as the opening motion
of a Lamborghini car door,
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The result of this expansion is that
American trademark jurisprudence has
come to resemble the moral rights of
attribution and integrity of the Civil Law
world, This means that the trademark
right is far stronger than it was in previous decades, This also means that it
operates as a more effective sword in the
world of corporate competition,
This entire expansion trajectory has
happened slowly but inextricably
behind closed doors, Congress has
made incremental changes over the
years that add up to the creation of a
new trademark jurisprudence, one that
resembles the moral rights of attribution
and integrity rather than one honest to
the historical roots of trademark
jurisprudence, If the United States is to
so fundamentally change our trademark
jurisprudence, a broader debate
is required,

